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The composition and management of 
capital flows in the Philippines 
Amando M Tetangco, Jr
1 
Introduction 
The surge in capital flows to emerging market economies in the early to mid-1990s was a reflection of 
the rapid expansion and integration of international capital markets that had been driven by economic 
policy and structural changes. Technological advances and the emergence of increasingly 
sophisticated financial products have likewise increased the speed and complexity of capital account 
transactions. The global and domestic factors which influence capital flows to emerging markets can 
be categorised into two broad groups.
2 The first group is composed of country-specific or pull factors 
which determine the destination of flows. The pull factors include the adoption of economic 
liberalisation policies, improved macroeconomic performance, more investment opportunities and 
institutional reforms implemented in some developing countries. The second group covers push 
factors or those that are outside the control of a borrowing country. These include structural and 
cyclical conditions in lending countries which determine the timing and magnitude of flows. This paper 
will review and examine the experience of the Philippines regarding capital flows since the 1990s. It 
will focus mainly on the policy issues the country faced during the period. 
Continued rise in financial integration in Asia 
Some countries in Asia have been experiencing greater financial integration in the past two decades. 
This is based in part on the fact that the magnitude of capital flows in these economies has risen 
significantly.
3 Table 1 presents gross private capital flows in selected Asian economies and shows that 
as a percentage of GDP, financial flows indeed increased between the 1980s and the early 1990s.
4 
The capital flows peaked around the 1996-98 period, and subsequently declined to more modest 
levels. 
Another indicator of greater financial openness of these countries is the stronger linkage of their equity 
markets with major equity markets elsewhere in the world. Table 2 presents the simple correlation of 
stock markets in selected Asian countries with each other and with the equity markets in the United 
States and Japan.
5 It may be observed that the correlation between the equity markets generally 
increased during the period 1996-2003 compared to 1990-95. 
                                                       
1  Deputy Governor, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (the central bank). 
2  See, for example, Yap (2001). 
3  For comments on the advantages and disadvantages of gross capital flows as a measure of financial integration see, for 
example, Montiel (1994). 
4  Gross capital flows are computed as the sum of inflows and outflows of items under the capital and financial accounts of the 
balance of payments as reported in the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Trade credits were not included in the 
computation. 




1 as a percentage of GDP: 
selected Asian countries 
  Hong Kong 
SAR  Indonesia Korea  Malaysia  Philippines Singapore  Thailand 
1980-84 ...  4.8  4.8 13.2 7.1  35.4  1.9 
1985-89 ...  3.5  4.6  7.9 1.9  40.2  4.9 
1990-94 ...  4.4  5.5 13.9 8.0  40.7  11.0 
1995 ...  5.6  11.0  9.6 12.1  53.6  17.2 
1996 ...  5.3  13.1  9.9 18.3  65.3  11.9 
1997 ...  4.7  8.1  11.9 8.2  128.0  19.0 
1998 203.2 10.1  8.3  11.1 8.8  43.0  26.0 
1999 166.0  4.2  6.7  18.0 19.4  86.0  19.4 
2000 152.7  5.2  7.7  15.4 8.1  59.2  13.4 
2001 109.0  5.2  9.7  6.0 4.8  57.3  9.7 
1  Does not include trade credits. 





Average correlation of stock market returns
1 
  Hang 
Seng 
Jakarta 
SE  KOSPI KLSE PHISIX Strait 




1990-2003  0.52 0.41 0.37 0.48 0.51 0.58 0.51 0.32 0.42 
1990-95  0.52 0.33 0.19 0.54 0.48 0.58 0.49 0.25 0.35 
1996-2003  0.52 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.53 0.58 0.53 0.40 0.46 
1  Computed as the simple correlation of a stock market with all the other stock markets included in the table.  
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 
Trends and impact of capital flows in the Philippines 
Trends and composition 
Total net capital flows (excluding trade credits) to the Philippines grew steadily from 1992 as the 
country undertook foreign exchange liberalisation measures. Capital inflows declined in 1995 as 
access to international financial markets was affected by the Tequila (Mexican peso) financial crisis. 
The annual increase in capital flows reached a peak of about 220% in 1996 (Table 3b). However, as 
total capital flows to emerging market economies fell in 1997 in the aftermath of the Asian financial 
crisis, net capital flows to the country declined in 1997 and 1998. Capital inflows recovered sharply in 
1999, supported by a surge in portfolio investments, but have since steadily declined. For the first 
seven months of 2003, capital and financial account posted a total net outflow of more than 
$300 million (Table 3a). The deterioration resulted from the weak performance of the direct, portfolio 
and other investment accounts, reflecting the still cautious stance of investors and net repayment of 


























Net capital flows in the Philippines
1 
In millions of US dollars 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
2 
Total capital flows, net  1,529  1,864  1,859  2,850 4,438 3,468  11,078  6,594  196 4,090  3,022 1,713  818  –332 
Capital  account  1 0  1  0 0 0  3  1  16  –8  38  –12  –19  –13 
Financial account  1,528  1,864  1,858 2,850  4,438  3,468 11,075 6,593  180  4,098 2,984 1,725  837  –319 
• Direct  investment  528 527  675  864  1,462  2,014  474  1,086  2,108 1,754  1,453 1,142 1,026  10 
• Portfolio  investment  –128  361  –954  324  1,156 1,227  3,560  1,241  –749 6,874 207  1,050  1,912  1,005 
 Of  which:  bonds  –80  236  –1,016  376  887 979  1,381  1,592  –829  5,519  432 671  1,523 853 
• Other  investment  1,128  976  2,137 1,662  1,820  227  7,041 4,266 –1,179  –4,530 1,324  –467 –2,101  –1,334 
 Of  which:  loans  511  634  2,210  1,551  2,261  274 4,007  1,971 2,235  318  1,661 –652  –571 –763 
1  Excludes trade credits.   
2  January-July. 
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 
 
Table 3b 
Net capital flows in the Philippines
1 
Growth rates, in per cent 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
2 
Total capital flows, net  21.9 –0.3 53.3  55.7  –21.9 219.4 –40.5  –97.0  1,986.7 –26.1 –43.3 –52.2  –127.1 
Capital account  –100.0  .  –100.0  .  .  .  –66.7 1,500.0 –150.0 575.0 –131.6  –58.3  –44.4 
Financial account  22.0  –0.3  53.4 55.7  –21.9  219.3  –40.5 –97.3  2,176.7  –27.2 –42.2 –51.5  –125.9 
• Direct  investment  –0.2  28.1 28.0  69.2 37.8 –76.5 129.1  94.1  –16.8 –17.2 –21.4 –10.2 –98.9 
• Portfolio  investment  382.0  –364.3 134.0  256.8  6.1  190.1 –65.1  –160.4  1,017.8 –97.0  407.2  82.1  –21.5 
 Of  which:  bonds  395.0  –530.5  137.0  135.9  10.4 41.1  15.3  –152.1  765.7 –92.2  55.3  127.0  –7.8 
• Other  investment  –13.5  119.0  –22.2 9.5  –87.5  3,001.8  –39.4 –127.6  –284.2  129.2 –135.3 –349.9  –45.2 
 Of  which:  loans  24.1  248.6  –29.8  45.8  –87.9 1,362.4 –50.8  13.4 –85.8  422.3  –139.3 12.4  –633.6 
1  Excludes trade credits.   
2  Growth for the period January-July 2003 was computed relative to the comparable level for 2002. 



























Composition of capital flows in the Philippines
1 
In per cent 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
2 
Capital  account  0.1  0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  8.2  –0.2  1.3 –0.7 –2.3  –3.9 
Financial account  99.9  100.0  99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  91.8 100.2 98.7 100.7 102.3  –96.1 
• Direct  investment  34.5  28.3 36.3 30.3 32.9 58.1  4.3 16.5  1,075.5 42.9  48.1 66.7  125.4  3.0 
• Portfolio  investment  –8.4  19.4  –51.3 11.4 26.0 35.4 32.1 18.8  –382.1  168.1 6.8  61.3  233.7  302.7 
 Of  which:  bonds  –5.2  12.7  –54.7 13.2 20.0 28.2 12.5 24.1  –423.0  134.9  14.3 39.2  186.2  256.9 
• Other  investment  73.8  52.4  115.0 58.3 41.0  6.5 63.6 64.7 –601.5  –110.8 43.8 –27.3  –256.8  –401.8 
 Of  which:  loans  33.4  34.0  118.9 54.4 50.9  7.9 36.2 29.9  1,140.3  7.8  55.0 –38.1 –69.8  –229.8 
1  Excludes trade credits.   
2  January-July. 
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 
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In terms of composition, direct investments and loan availments comprised a significant share of 
foreign flows as they accounted for an average of about 37% and 50%, respectively, during the period 
1990-95 (Table 3c). The share of these two components declined significantly in 1996-97 but 
recovered in 1998. From 1999 portfolio investments, particularly investments in bonds, and direct 
investments have generally been the most important sources of capital inflows. 
Impact 
The surge in capital flows in the 1990s affected the performance of the Philippine economy. Several 
areas were influenced by the trends in capital flows including the growth of domestic liquidity, volatility 
of financial markets, the movement of the real exchange rate and even asset booms. 
1.  Domestic liquidity, credit and dollarisation 
Domestic liquidity and credit. From 1990 to 1997, domestic liquidity (M3) grew by an average of 19.8% 
annually (Table 4). The growth in money supply, which peaked at 26.5% in 1994, was supported by 
the rapid expansion in both the net foreign assets (NFA) and net domestic assets (NDA) of residents. 
NFA reverted to positive levels starting 1992 and grew as the liberalisation of foreign exchange 
regulations beginning that year resulted in higher foreign exchange inflows, including those from 
remittances of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs). This development helped boost the monetary 
authorities’ NFA position, as banks and the national government sold part of their foreign exchange 
holdings to the central bank, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). However, NFA contracted in 1996 
and was negative in 1997 following the Asian financial crisis. Meanwhile, NDA continued to grow from 
1993 to 1997 as the intermediation of capital inflows by banks resulted in the expansion of the 





Level (in millions of pesos)  Annual growth rate (in per cent) 
  NFA NDA  M3  NFA NDA  M3 
1990 (93,816)  474,495  300,541 32.74 26.66  18.36 
1991 (15,580)  453,822  347,079 83.39 –4.36  15.48 
1992 62,986  432,590  385,385 504.27  –4.68  11.04 
1993 82,882  552,745  480,329 31.59 27.78  24.64 
1994 99,291  690,298  607,614 19.80 24.89  26.50 
1995 111,408  907,313  761,430 12.20 31.44  25.31 
1996 80,052  1,196,920  881,404 –28.15  31.92  15.76 
1997 (76,855)  1,684,692  1,066,017 –196.01 40.75  20.95 
1998 140,506  1,538,819  1,144,552 282.82  –8.66  7.37 
1999 328,982  1,608,735  1,365,098 134.14  4.54  19.27 
2000 342,667  1,736,698  1,427,397 4.16 7.95  4.56 
2001 405,326  1,759,550  1,525,032 18.29  1.32  6.84 
2002 541,411  1,809,334  1,669,662 33.57  2.83  9.48 
Aug 2003  605,338  1,741,001  1,619,013 13.81  4.11  3.77 
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 
 
Beginning in 1998, the growth in M3 declined markedly as the slowdown in NDA offset the continued 
rise of NFA. The deceleration in NDA may be attributed mainly to lower net credits to the private sector 
as the weak performance of the corporate sector during this period prompted banks to adopt a more 
cautious lending stance. At the same time, the economic slowdown and uncertainty in the international 
and domestic environment dampened the private sector’s appetite for credit. The increase in NFA may  
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7 The magnitude of dollar-denominated assets held by residents or the degree of 
dollarisation has been increasing since the 1990s to coincide with the surge in capital inflows.
8 Using 
the IMF standard, an economy is considered highly dollarised if the ratio of foreign currency deposits 
(FCDs) to money supply is greater than 30%. Table 5 shows that the ratio of FCDs to M3 for the 
Philippines increased from 21.2% in 1990 to 40.8% as of August 2003. Meanwhile, the ratio of FCDs 
to M4 (which is comparable to the IMF methodology) increased from 17.5 to 29.0% in the same 
period. This implies that the Philippines is nearing the threshold for a highly dollarised economy based 
on the standard set by the IMF. The increasing trend in dollarisation of the country could be attributed 
to institutional changes, particularly capital account liberalisation. The liberalisation of foreign 
exchange regulations in 1992 facilitated greater access of nationals to foreign currency assets and 
was mainly behind the surge in portfolio investments to the Philippines. The strength of foreign 
exchange inflows from OFWs and the recovery of exports also contributed to the continued growth in 
FCDs of non-bank residents. Expectations on the movements of the exchange rate likewise played a 
role in the build-up of FCDs. The expectation of a depreciating trend in the peso has partly 
encouraged foreign exchange earners to keep some portion of their dollar receipts in FCDs. The 
degree of dollarisation peaked in 1998 and has since remained generally at the same level. 
 
Table 5 
Ratio of FCDs to broad monetary aggregates 
January 1990-August 2003 
 M3  FCDs  M4=M3+FCDs  FCDs/M3  FCDs/M4 
1990 300,541  63,808  364,349 21.23  17.51 
1991 347,079  77,225  424,304 22.25  18.20 
1992 385,385  94,458  479,843 24.51  19.69 
1993 480,329  136,158  616,487 28.35  22.09 
1994 607,614  158,788  766,402 26.13  20.72 
1995 761,430  206,691  968,121 27.15  21.35 
1996 881,404  317,564  1,198,968 36.03  26.49 
1997 1,066,017  433,428  1,499,445 40.66  28.91 
1998 1,144,552  477,935  1,622,487 41.76  29.46 
1999 1,365,098  521,664  1,886,762 38.21  27.65 
2000 1,427,397  585,986  2,013,383 41.05  29.10 
2001 1,525,032  586,087  2,111,119 38.43  27.76 
2002 1,669,662  628,448  2,298,110 37.64  27.35 
Aug 2003  1,619,013  660,658 2,279,671  40.81  28.98 
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 
                                                       
6  The revaluation adjustments to the asset side are reflected under NFA while adjustments to the liability side are reflected 
under NDA (ie net other items). 
7  Official or full dollarisation occurs when foreign currency (the US dollar is the most common) has exclusive or predominant 
status as full legal tender. This means that not only is foreign currency legal for use in contracts between private parties, but 
that the government also uses it in payments. Domestic currency may still exist but it is confined to a very minor role, usually 
coins that are used for small change. Meanwhile, partial dollarisation occurs when people hold a portion of their financial 
wealth in foreign assets. This is equivalent to “asset substitution” which results from the public’s allocation decisions in view 
of the risk and return characteristics of domestic and foreign assets. 
8  Theoretically, the extent of dollarisation is measured by the amount of dollar-denominated assets held by nationals. These 
cover dollar currency circulating within the economy, foreign currency deposits in the domestic economy, and cross-border 
deposits held in banks abroad. In practice, because of data constraints, the extent of dollarisation is usually measured by 
the ratio of foreign currency deposits held by residents to a broad money aggregate.  
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2. Volatility 
Foreign exchange market. During the period 1980-89, the Philippine peso was generally stable with 
the average standard deviation of the daily exchange rates during the period at P0.60 (Table 6). 
Volatility increased to an average of P1.12 during the next five years (1990-94) as the rise in capital 
inflows exerted appreciation pressures on the peso in the foreign exchange market. Average volatility 
rose further to an average of P1.33 in 1995-99 as a result of heightened pressure on the peso 
following domestic and external shocks, such as the 1995 Tequila, 1997 Asian and 1998 Russian 
financial crises and the 1995 rice crisis. The spread of investor pessimism on emerging markets 
following the financial crisis in mid-1997 led to a slowdown in capital inflows into the Philippines and 
severe depreciation pressure on the peso. Volatility again rose to an average of P1.74 in 2000-03 with 
the sharp depreciation of the peso as a result of persistent negative market sentiment. Domestic 











1  Standard deviation of the daily FX rates. 
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 
 
Stock market. The volatility of the local equity market during the period 1995-2003 is shown in Table 7. 
The volatility of the Philippine Stock Market Composite Index (PHISIX) averaged about 270.79 index 
points during 1995-99 as higher risk aversion and herding behaviour by investors during the 1997 
Asian financial crisis reversed portfolio equity flows. The next four years (2000-03) were more stable, 
with average volatility of 169.22 index points despite the political and security concerns during the 
period. The local stock market has generally been stable during the past two years due to positive 








1  Standard deviation of the daily PHISIX (Philippine Stock Market Composite Index). 
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 
 
3.  Real effective exchange rate (REER) 
The surge in capital inflows during the first half of the 1990s led to a nominal appreciation of the peso. 
Inflation during this period was moderate despite the rapid growth of money supply as the economy 
was undergoing financial deepening and the demand for money increased. The moderate level of  
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inflation combined with the nominal appreciation of the peso contributed to a real appreciation in the 
REER index of the peso against the currency baskets of its major trading partners (MTPs) and 
competitor countries (CCs) (Table 8). 
 
Table 8 
Average real effective exchange rate index of the peso 
Dec 1980 = 100 
Level  Change, in per cent 












1990 69.20  86.90  124.41 –2.14  –2.97  –0.97 
1991 68.18  84.32  126.38 –1.47  –2.97  1.58 
1992 76.37  92.68  140.70 12.01  9.91  11.33 
1993 74.15  91.48  133.76 –2.91  –1.29  –4.93 
1994 79.57  95.75  141.92 7.31  4.67  6.10 
1995 84.30  102.20  146.36 5.94  6.74  3.13 
1996 90.53  106.57  147.11 7.39  4.28  0.51 
1997 88.08  107.09  156.26 –2.71  0.49  6.22 
1998 69.00  122.24  218.11 –21.66  14.15  39.58 
1999 73.95  117.89  189.70 7.17  –3.56  –13.03 
2000 68.68  109.54  169.97 –7.12  –7.08  –10.40 
2001 64.19  113.84  180.49 –6.54  3.92  6.19 
2002 63.41  106.48  161.41 –1.21  –6.47  –10.57 
Oct 2003  57.40  99.24  145.21 –10.50  –7.68  –11.17 
Note: Deutsche mark rates derived by dividing the euro-dollar rate by a fixed euro-Deutsche mark rate. 
1  Euro area, Japan, United Kingdom, United States.   
2  Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan 
(China), Thailand.   
3  Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand. 
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 
 
Meanwhile, the slowdown in capital inflows and the eventual reversal to outflows which occurred 
during the period 1997-2003 led to a depreciation of the REER of the peso against the MTP basket of 
currencies. Against CCs, the peso initially lost competitiveness as the REER for the broad and narrow 
baskets of CCs appreciated during the second half of the 1990s. This was due to the greater nominal 
depreciation of CCs against the US dollar. However, during the last three years, the REER against the 
broad and narrow baskets of competitor currencies has posted depreciations, due mainly to the 
nominal depreciation of the peso against the currencies in these baskets and the narrowing of the 
inflation differentials. 
4.  Asset price inflation 
The surge in capital flows and the growth of the economy were also accompanied by a rapid rise in 
real estate prices. Selected real property prices in the central financial districts in Metro Manila, 
Philippines are shown in Table 9.  
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Table 9 
Selected indicators of real property prices in the Philippines 
Pesos/sqm 








3 Ortigas Makati  Makati 
 1991  80,000  45,000  25,000  250 
 1992  83,500  50,000  30,000  310 
 1993  111,500  60,000  34,000  275 
 1994  182,500  75,000  36,500  300 
 1995  312,500  110,000  56,000  330 
 1996  412,500  180,000  64,000  460 
 1997  425,000  195,000  64,000  475 
 1998  312,500  120,000  74,000  500 
 1999  237,500  105,000  72,500  327 
 2000  223,125  98,750  70,834  369 
 2001  180,000    80,000  65,000  358 
 2002  171,250    77,500  64,500  345 
 2003
4 171,250  77,500  64,000  331 
1  Residential capital value is computed as price of floor area of commercial/residential condominium space.   
2  Monthly 
rental  values.   
3    For 1991-96, average commercial land values for the Ayala, Paseo de Roxas and Salcedo Village 
properties. For 1997 onwards, commercial land values for the whole Makati Central Business District (CBD), including Ayala, 
Paseo de Roxas and Salcedo Village properties.   
 4  As of March 2003. 
Sources: 1991-97, Cuevo Far East, Inc, Metro Manila; August 1997, Market Overview; 1997-2002, Colliers Jardine 
Philippines, Inc. 
 
Commercial real property prices in Makati and Ortigas peaked in 1997, having grown more than 
fivefold and fourfold, respectively, from the price levels in 1991. Residential property prices, on the 
other hand, peaked in 1998, increasing by about twice the price levels in 1991. Commercial and 
residential property prices showed a downtrend after 1997 amid investor fears of a property glut 
occurring in the country similar to that observed in countries more severely affected by the Asian 
crisis. 
The trend in capital flows also partly influenced the performance of the domestic equity market 
(Table 10). The PHISIX surged by a record 154.8% in 1993 due to the sustained single digit inflation 
rate, higher GNP growth and significant structural reforms undertaken since the start of the 1990s. 
Among the important reforms which contributed to brisk activity in the stock market were the 
liberalisation of foreign investments and the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions. In late 1994 and 
1995, however, the PHISIX posted declines of 14.1% and 6.9%, respectively, due to both external 
(Mexican crisis and fall of Barings) and domestic factors (build-up in inflationary pressures and 
pending implementation of an oil price hike). The market posted a modest recovery in 1996 but lost 
momentum in 1997 during the Asian financial crisis. Some strengthening was experienced in 1998 and 
1999 with a decline in interest rates and the restoration of some stability in the foreign exchange 
market. The recovery in the market was, however, not sustained as domestic political and security 
concerns and global uncertainty tempered investor activity in the equity market from 2000 until late 
2003.  
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Table 10 
Stock market for the period 1990-2003 
PHISIX 
 
Level Growth  rate 
1990 653.1  –41.2 
1991 1,154.3  76.7 
1992 1,272.4  10.2 
1993 3,241.9  154.8 
1994 2,785.8  –14.1 
1995 2,594.2  –6.9 
1996 3,170.6  22.2 
1997 1,869.2  –41.0 
1998 1,968.8  5.3 
1999 2,143.0  8.8 
2000 1,494.5  –30.3 
2001 1,168.1  –21.8 
2002 1,018.4  –12.8 
Oct 2003  1,399.1  37.4 
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. 
Policy responses to the increase in the magnitude of capital flows 
The increase in the magnitude and the reversal of capital flows brings to the fore various issues that 
need to be addressed by monetary authorities. The impact of capital flows on liquidity growth, degree 
of dollarisation and financial markets required adjustments in the conduct of monetary policy. Another 
response undertaken by monetary authorities to the rise in capital flows was the strengthening of the 
domestic financial system. These adjustments in monetary and financial sector policies were further 
complemented by, among others, initiatives to improve the monitoring of capital flows and the 
development of early warning systems. 
Implications for the conduct of monetary policy in the Philippines 
Greater financial integration means increased inflows of capital that can ease the foreign exchange 
requirement of a country. However, the inflows, by their sheer magnitude, could have some 
destabilising effects on the economy that would complicate the task of monetary and exchange rate 
management. 
During the surge of inflows in the early to mid-1990s, there were concerns that the appreciation of the 
peso might adversely affect the country’s competitiveness. Some participation in the foreign exchange 
market by the BSP, through dollar purchases, was required to stem the sharp strengthening of the 
peso and avoid a substantial loss in competitiveness. While such action addresses the 
competitiveness issue, there were concerns that the accommodation of the capital inflows by the 
monetary authorities might lead to expansion in liquidity and create inflationary pressures. However, 
the monetary authorities noted that the economy was undergoing a period of financial deepening and 
that the demand for money was expanding. The financial deepening was indicated by the notable rise 
in both the M4/GDP and M3/GDP ratios during the first half of the 1990s as the economy was 
undergoing a process of financial liberalisation (Table 11). It was also noted that the acceleration in 
the expansion of domestic liquidity, particularly in 1993-95, was not accompanied by a significant  
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uptick in inflation. Thus, some additional expansion in domestic liquidity might not necessarily be 
inflationary, as this was used to support the expansion of activities in the economy. Accordingly, 
monetary policy partly accommodated the capital inflows and tolerated some uptick in the growth of 
money supply. The BSP built up its net foreign assets with the impact on domestic liquidity only 
partially sterilised. Changes in the net domestic assets of the BSP did not completely offset the 
increases in its net foreign assets (Table 12). This approach allowed the provision of adequate liquidity 
to support economic growth while ensuring that inflation objectives were achieved. 
 
Table 11 
Indicators of financial deepening, 1990-2002 
 M4/GDP  M3/GDP  M4  growth M3  growth  Inflation 
1990 33.82 27.90 22.36 18.36  13.20 
1991 34.00 27.81 16.46 15.48  18.50 
1992 35.50 28.51 13.09 11.04 8.60 
1993 41.81 32.58 28.48 24.64 7.00 
1994 45.27 35.89 24.32 26.50 8.30 
1995 50.79 39.95 26.32 25.31 8.00 
1996 55.20 40.58 23.84 15.76 9.10 
1997 61.79 43.93 25.06 20.95 5.90 
1998 60.88 42.95  8.21 7.37  9.70 
1999 63.38 45.86 16.29 19.27 6.70 
2000 60.02 42.55  6.71 4.56  4.40 
2001 57.47 41.51  4.85 6.84  6.10 
2002 57.13 41.51  8.86 9.48  3.10 





Change in net foreign assets and net domestic assets of the BSP 
In billions of pesos 
 NFA  NDA 
1991 71,997  –51,355 
1992 106,711  –91,236 
1993 18,607 8,301 
1994 35,015  –24,348 
1995 26,572 3,750 
1996 114,316  –83,793 
1997 –20,776 43,978 
1998 21,341  –47,973 
1999 120,673  –38,775 
2000 54,454  –67,973 
2001 –13,525 18,185 
2002 82,382  –39,171 
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.  
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During the second half of the 1990s, Philippine policymakers again faced conflicting policy choices in 
times of sudden reversals of capital flows and exaggerated fluctuations in the foreign exchange rate. 
On the one hand, tight monetary policies were required to adjust to the diminished demand for 
domestic assets, limit the extent of exchange rate depreciation, and contain inflationary pressures. On 
the other hand, tight monetary policy could create an adverse impact on corporate and financial 
health. The BSP undertook a delicate balancing act of limiting the depreciation of the currency and the 
rise in interest rates. The goal was to allow some depreciation and accept a temporary rise in interest 
rates to restore stability in the foreign exchange market and at the same time limit the adverse effects 
on the balance sheets of banks and corporates. 
In January 2002, the BSP formally shifted to an inflation targeting framework from a monetary 
aggregate targeting approach in formulating monetary policy. The shift in the policy framework was 
prompted by the observation that the historical relationship between inflation and money supply had 
weakened, thus undermining the effectiveness of a monetary aggregate targeting policy framework. 
This weakening of the link between inflation and money supply could partly be attributed to the effects 
of financial liberalisation, such as the emergence of new financial products and increased financial 
integration. 
Under the inflation targeting framework, capital flows can have important implications for monetary 
policy formulation. They influence monetary policy essentially because of their impact on exchange 
rates, which in turn affect domestic prices. Massive and sudden outflows of foreign funds result in 
volatile exchange rates affecting import prices and inflation. Current estimates of the exchange rate 
pass-through into inflation in the Philippines indicate a minimal influence on consumer prices. 
Sensitivity analysis shows that a one-peso depreciation against the dollar leads to about a 
0.11 percentage point cumulative annual increase in inflation. However, if exchange rate movements 
subsequently lead to wage and oil price adjustments, then the impact on inflation would be higher. 
Statistical exercises estimate that a one-peso depreciation against the dollar combined with a 
1% increase in domestic oil prices lead to about a 0.16 percentage point cumulative annual increase 
in inflation. Meanwhile, a 1% increase in wages increases inflation by an average of about 
0.065 percentage points over a 12-month period. 
Another channel through which capital flows can affect prices and inflation expectations is the interest 
rate channel. An outflow of capital or a drop in access to foreign financing would imply a 
corresponding increase in demand for domestic financing, from both banks and non-banks. If the 
domestic liquidity situation is tight, the loss of access to foreign capital may lead to an increase in 
interest rates and can have inflationary repercussions. 
Finally, capital flows can affect the conduct of monetary policy through their direct impact on money 
supply, which, in turn, can possibly affect future inflation outcomes. Significant capital flows influence 
domestic liquidity via changes in net foreign assets and this impact is monitored by monetary 
authorities. Moreover, increased capital flows can also have important implications on how we 
measure liquidity in the economy. As the use of foreign exchange in domestic transactions becomes 
more widespread, the measure of monetary aggregate should include a foreign currency component. 
Thus, monetary authorities are now monitoring developments in M4, which includes foreign currency 
denominated deposits held by residents, and assessing their impact on the inflation outlook. 
Promotion of the stability and efficiency of the domestic financial system to support stable 
capital flows 
The new globalised economic environment has created opportunities as well as risks in the financial 
system. The risks have been highlighted by the impact of the 1997 Asian crisis on the banking system. 
For example, as the performance of the corporate sector slowed down and the property market 
declined, the quality of banks’ loan portfolios significantly deteriorated (see Table 13 in the next 
section). However, the impact of the crisis on the banking sector was not as dramatic as that observed 
in the other crisis-hit countries. This may be attributed to the fact that other countries experienced a 
surge in capital flows earlier than the Philippines (see, for example, Table 1). Thus, the Philippine 
banking system was not as exposed as those in the other countries, such as in the property sector or 
in accumulating foreign exchange liabilities. 
In response to the distress experienced in the banking sector, the BSP embarked on an aggressive 
and wide-ranging reform process. It adopted changes in the regulatory and supervisory framework to 
be able to effectively meet the demands and challenges of globally integrated financial markets and 
the growing sophistication of financial products and services. This process of reform is geared towards  
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greater commitment to risk management, strengthening of the regulatory framework and supervision 
techniques, promotion of transparency and good corporate governance, and putting in place the 
necessary infrastructure requirements. The BSP, working closely with the banking sector, has made 
important progress on these fronts. 
The umbrella for the reform process was the enactment of the General Banking Law (GBL) in May 
2000. This legislation amended the old banking law and comprehensively updated the basic legal 
framework for the regulation and supervision of the banking system. The law provided for the 
enhancement of the supervisory capability and enforcement powers of the BSP, the improvement of 
prudential and regulatory standards, and the encouragement of greater competition in the financial 
industry. Some of the specific features of this new law include: 
•  granting authority to the Monetary Board to require banks to adopt internationally accepted 
standards relating to risk-based capital adequacy; 
•  providing for stricter rules governing bank exposure to directors, officers, stockholders and 
related interests (DOSRI); 
•  strengthening current regulations with respect to transparency practices; 
•  adopting fit-and-proper rule tests in the appointment of bank directors and senior bank 
officials; and 
•  liberalising further the ownership participation of foreign banks in the local banking system to 
100% within seven years of the Act coming into force. 
In terms of upgrading the regulatory framework, the BSP adopted a risk-based approach to bank 
supervision to effectively manage risks inherent in today’s highly complex financial environment and 
avoid potential bank as well as systemic problems. A key element of this approach is the introduction 
of a risk-based capital adequacy framework consistent with international best practice.
9 Initially, the 
new capital requirement covers only credit risk and prescribes a 10% risk-based capital ratio on a solo 
and consolidated basis.
10 Recently the BSP released the guidelines for incorporating market risk into 
the capital adequacy framework. 
The emergence of financial conglomerates also raised concerns on the effectiveness of the traditional 
approach to managing banking risks. Thus, the BSP implemented a consolidated approach to 
supervision. With this approach the BSP has strengthened its regulatory oversight by having a more 
comprehensive assessment of the risks involved in the activities of financial groups.
11 
Furthermore, to avoid systemic failures, the BSP launched intensive monitoring of banks by improving 
its on- and off-site surveillance system, adopting a proactive approach in managing problem banks, 
and designating specialised prompt corrective action units to handle potential problem banks. 
To facilitate the efforts by banks to improve the quality of their loan portfolios, the BSP supported the 
passage of the Special Purpose Vehicle Act (SPVA) of 2002. The SPVA provides tax incentives to 
facilitate the establishment of private sector led asset management companies which would buy 
banks’ non-performing assets and enable banks to clean up their balance sheets. Already, two asset 
management firms have registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission since the 
enactment of the SPVA. There are no transactions yet involving the bulk transfer of non-performing 
assets of banks but there are ongoing negotiations, primarily on pricing differences. In a survey 
conducted by the BSP in August 2003, about 20 commercial banks expressed intentions to avail 
themselves of the benefits provided under the SPVA. 
                                                       
9  The legal basis for the risk-based capital requirement is embodied in Section 34 of the General Banking Law of 2000. 
10  Circular no 280 dated 29 March 2001 contained the guidelines on the risk-based capital adequacy framework which initially 
covered only capital requirements for credit risks. Circular no 360 dated 3 December 2002 specified the guidelines to 
incorporate market risk into the framework for universal and commercial banks. 
11  In fact, the BSP reorganised its departments under the Supervision and Examination Sector (SES) and a regrouping of the 
banks assigned to the various bank examination departments whereby parent banks are grouped with their subsidiaries and 
affiliates in line with consolidated supervision.  
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The BSP also strengthened and aligned its prudential standards with international norms for better 
corporate governance, greater transparency and reduced moral hazard. These measures highlight the 
fundamental obligation of the board of directors that it is held primarily responsible for the proper 
governance of the bank. Some of the specific initiatives to this end include: 
•  expanding the duties and responsibilities of the board of directors to achieve a more prudent 
and efficient administration of banks; 
•  requiring directors to attend special seminars on corporate governance; 
•  requiring the election of independent directors as members of the boards of directors of 
banks; 
•  selecting external auditors with a high level of competence and integrity; and 
•  adopting sound accounting rules in the compilation of financial statements, including those 
relating to classification of loan account, loan loss provisioning and loan restructuring. 
Support infrastructure was upgraded to make the financial system more efficient. Along this line, the 
BSP initiated the upgrading of the existing payment system to a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) 
system. The Philippine RTGS, also known as the Philippine Payment System or PhilPASS, was 
formally launched in December 2002. It is expected to minimise systemic risk as it allows real-time 
high-value payments between banks to be made using their deposit accounts with the BSP. 
To contribute to raising the quality of credit ratings the BSP issued a set of rules and regulations that 
will govern the recognition and derecognition of domestic credit rating agencies for bank supervisory 
purposes. The rules and regulations prescribe that: 
•  an applicant rating agency will be recognised by the BSP upon satisfaction of the minimum 
eligibility criteria, which include, among others, objectivity, independence, transparency, 
credibility, and compliance with internal procedures and certain disclosure requirements; 
•  while no minimum capital is required, credit rating agencies should have the financial 
capability to invest in the necessary technological infrastructure and employ sufficient 
professional analytical staff to ensure proper discharge of their duties and responsibilities; 
and 
•  existing credit rating agencies should have a track record of at least five years in the 
issuance of reliable and credible ratings, while in the case of new entrants, a probationary 
status may be granted on condition that they employ professional analytical staff with 
sufficient experience in the credit rating business. 
The adoption of the criteria for the accreditation of credit rating agencies will help ensure that the 
reliance of industry players and regulators on their ratings is well placed. 
Another measure that contributes to the build-up of market infrastructure is the establishment of the 
Fixed Income Exchange by the Bankers Association of the Philippines (BAP). At the time of writing 
there was no organised venue for the trading of debt securities, with Government Securities Eligible 
Dealers (GSEDs) and other SEC-registered selling agencies facilitating the trading of government and 
corporate instruments. To address this concern the BSP supported the establishment of an alternative 
fixed income exchange (FIE) that will provide the platform for the secondary trading of private and 
public fixed income securities such as government securities, commercial paper and asset-backed 
securities issued by companies.
12 The setting-up of the FIE will promote transparency and price 
                                                       
12  In relation to this, the Monetary Board, in May 2003, approved the BAP proposal for the BSP to act as a central custodian of 
banks’ proprietary holdings of government securities. At present, these are held electronically at the Registry of Scripless 
Securities of the Bureau of the Treasury (BTr), which registers the ownership of uncertificated and scripless government 
securities by debiting or crediting the respective securities account of the banks that are RoSS members while the cash 
settlement is performed by the BSP upon the advice of the BTr. The BSP’s custodianship will effectively eliminate 
settlement risk, as there will be simultaneous execution of cash and government securities settlement by one institution. The 
BSP can also do the marking-to-market of securities for a credible valuation of banks’ government securities holdings. The 
Monetary Board also approved in principle the operational framework of the Philippine Depository and Trust Company 
(PDTC) to provide a central securities depository and registry system, among others. Moreover, in July 2003, the BSP 
issued regulations allowing universal/commercial/thrift banks to invest in the FIE.  
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discovery in fixed income securities and further boost the deepening of the capital market. The growth 
of the capital market is expected to reduce the reliance on bank lending for credit. 
Improvements in the monitoring and transparency of capital flows 
In response to the increase in the volume of capital flows, there is a need to upgrade monitoring and 
transparency mechanisms with respect to such flows. A timely and comprehensive set of data on 
capital flows is important in guiding policymaking and in facilitating the functioning of markets. 
Information on capital flows can help economic authorities anticipate possible exchange rate 
movements or evaluate access conditions in international capital markets. Transparent data on capital 
flows can also help investors in evaluating the sustainability of a country’s external imbalances and 
economic prospects. To help reduce external vulnerability, the BSP has been strengthening its 
capacity to monitor capital movements and improving its balance of payments statistics. Monetary 
authorities are closely monitoring the magnitude and maturity profile of external obligations to avoid 
any bunching of maturities. Moreover, advance portfolio investment data from top custodian banks are 
being used and certain data are being incorporated into existing reporting requirements submitted by 
banks to the BSP to serve as early signs of any shifts in investor sentiment. 
To improve the transparency of economic information, the Philippines started subscribing to the IMF’s 
Special Data Dissemination Standards (SDDS) in 1996. By January 2001, the Philippines was in full 
compliance with the SDDS in the dissemination of the relevant data through the internet in accordance 
with the prescribed timeliness and frequency. The BSP’s participation in the SDDS has enhanced its 
capability to generate accurate and comparable macroeconomic and financial information on a regular 
and timely basis. This will contribute significantly to improving the quality and depth of its early warning 
system database. 
To facilitate the adoption of international norms, the Philippines is also participating in the formulation 
of Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs). These reports will assess the extent 
to which the Philippines conforms to various key international standards and codes that are relevant to 
the effective functioning of its economic and financial system.
13 Recently, the Data Module of the 
ROSC was conducted for the Philippines, aimed at inducing improvements in data needed by market 
participants and other users.
14 Resulting gains in transparency are expected to enable market 
participants and others to formulate better analysis, forecasts and investment decisions, thus reducing 
uncertainty and helping investors price risk on a sounder basis. The module covered assessment of 
dissemination practices as well as data quality for national accounts, consumer prices, producer 
prices, balance of payments, government finance, and monetary statistics. 
To complement the activities under the ROSCs the Philippines is also participating in the IMF-World 
Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), which is aimed at providing a comprehensive 
assessment of the strengths, risks and vulnerabilities of the financial system. The BSP and the 
Department of Finance agreed to a phased implementation of the FSAP, with the first mission having 
visited the country in October 2001. The results of the exercise are expected to help the national 
authorities identify and prioritise policy responses to enhance the efficiency and improve the resiliency 
of the financial sector against economic and other disturbances. Furthermore, the FSAP will also guide 
the IMF and the World Bank in their provision of development and technical assistance to the 
Philippine financial sector in the future. The FSAP mission in the Philippines recognised the important 
reforms in the financial sector that have been implemented and are still being pursued by the 
                                                       
13  Initially, the Philippines participated in the experimental stage of the ROSCs and was benchmarked against the standards 
and codes in the areas of corporate governance, accounting and auditing, and insolvency and creditor rights. The Philippine 
ROSC on Corporate Governance, which was released in September 2001, cited the advances made by the Philippines in 
the formation of bodies focused on governance issues (eg the Philippine Commission on Governance and the Institute for 
Corporate Directors) and the implementation of legal and regulatory reforms (eg the Securities Regulation Code). To 
strengthen the Philippine corporate governance system, the report suggested that further measures need to be pursued 
relating to issues on disclosure of non-financial information, strengthening the rights of shareholders, enhancing the role of 
boards of directors and ensuring the independence of audit. Three ROSC modules have been completed for the Philippines  
to date: Fiscal Transparency (5-18 September 2001); Monetary and Financial Policy Transparency (latter part of 2001); and 
the Data Module (1-16 September 2003). 
14  The assessment of data quality was based on the Data Quality Assessment Framework (DQAF) developed by the IMF 
Statistics Department and focused on methodological soundness, accuracy and reliability, serviceability and accessibility.  
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authorities. At the same time, the mission emphasised the need to strengthen the supervision and 
resolution framework, including a more defined and explicit prompt corrective action framework as well 
as legal reforms to strengthen the enforcement powers of supervisory authorities. In this regard, the 
BSP is currently reviewing its prompt corrective action framework while the initiative to enhance its 
supervisory powers is included in the amendments to the New Central Bank Act being supported by 
the BSP. 
The Philippine government also created an Investor Relations Office in July 2001 to formalise and 
facilitate active dialogue between government authorities and market participants. This serves as a 
mechanism for the government to identify early signs of concerns on the part of market participants, 
and thus help prevent crises. Information generated from this arrangement can provide important 
inputs and helpful validating tools for the BSP’s early warning systems. 
Early identification of vulnerability to external crises 
The magnitude and volatility of the capital flows in the past decade underscores the need for 
developing early warning indicators to anticipate foreign exchange and banking crises and to 
complement traditional macroeconomic models. At international level, multilateral institutions (eg the 
IMF, ADB and BIS) have been developing indicators and undertaking surveillance and monitoring 
activities. 
The BSP has developed a Bank Failure Early Warning System. The Bank Failure EWS produces a 
one-year ahead forecast of a bank’s solvency.
15 The adoption of this EWS allows the BSP to prioritise 
its supervisory focus to the most vulnerable banks based on the results and to initiate prompt 
corrective measures to prevent a larger problem down the road. The BSP is also currently developing 
an EWS for the Philippine economy that will identify in advance the vulnerable areas of the economy 
and alert the authorities in the event of an impending macroeconomic or financial crisis. 
Has the banking sector become more resilient? 
Having pursued a wide-ranging set of reforms, is the banking sector now more prepared to withstand 
the adverse effects of large and volatile capital flows? 
The regulatory and supervisory framework for banks has improved with the changes that are being 
implemented as outlined in the previous section. The shift to risk-based supervision, the adoption of 
consolidated supervision and the development of an early warning system place the supervisory 
authorities in a better position to identify emerging weaknesses at both the institutional and sectoral 
levels of the financial system. Moreover, the BSP is seeking amendments to the New Central Bank Act 
of 1993 to further strengthen the supervisory capability of the central bank. Important reforms being 
proposed in this regard involve: (1) providing the BSP with sufficient flexibility to conduct banking 
examinations depending on bank risk profile; (2) implementing prompt corrective action in the case of 
problem/distressed banks; and (3) imposing stronger criminal and administrative penalties for violation 
of banking laws and regulations. 
In terms of the performance of financial institutions, banks in the Philippines have made some 
progress in recovering after the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Table 13). The liquidity of the banking 
system has been steadily increasing since the crisis as banks build up investments in risk-free 
government securities and cash positions. The banking system is also adequately capitalised as 
capital ratios remain above the 10% minimum requirement. The resiliency of the banking system is 
further seen in the improvement of bank profitability in 2001 and 2002 after a string of earnings 
contractions in 1998-2000. Profitability was buoyed by non-interest income, particularly trading gains 
                                                       
15  The EWS produces a one-year ahead forecast of a bank’s Residual Capital Cover (RCC) ratio, a variable constructed to 
proxy for bank solvency. Conceptually, the RCC represents the residual capital after non-performing assets are written 
down in proportion to net assets. A negative RCC value implies that bank capital is effectively wiped out. On the other hand, 
the larger the positive value, the more capital is available to back up assets. Referring to the Basel Committee 
recommendation of a minimum Tier 1 (core) capital of 4%, the critical RCC value should be at least positive 4%.  
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in government securities. Interest income, sourced mainly from the resurgence of credit card lending 
and the continued build-up of investments in government securities, grew only modestly. The 
improvement in the profitability of banks also reflects the diminishing impact of required provisioning 
on the bottom line of banks. As the non-performing loans (NPLs) of banks stabilise, the need for 




Selected financial ratios of the Philippine banking system 
1990-March 2003 
In per cent 























1990 56.1  24.6  3.1  18.0  ...  7.9  4.4  ... 
1991 54.7  20.5  2.8  19.5  ...  7.3  3.8  ... 
1992 53.2  17.3  2.4  20.2  ...  6.8  3.3  ... 
1993 44.7  15.1  1.9  19.2  ...  5.3  2.5  ... 
1994 44.3  15.4  2.0  18.6  ...  4.7  2.0  ... 
1995 39.9  14.8  2.1  18.8  ...  4.0  1.7  ... 
1996 35.8  16.4  2.2  16.8  ...  3.5  1.4  ... 
1997 33.7  12.4  1.7  16.0  ...  5.4  2.3  ... 
1998 36.2  5.8  0.9  17.7  ...  11.0  4.0  ... 
1999 36.7  2.9  0.5  17.5  ...  12.7  5.8  13.5 
2000 39.7  2.6  0.4  16.2  ...  15.0  6.5  12.7 
2001 42.0  2.9  0.5  16.1 14.5  16.9  7.6  12.3 
2002 45.2  4.8  0.8  16.7 15.7  14.9  7.5  11.9 
2003 45.9  1.6  0.3  17.0 16.8  14.9  7.4  11.78
7 
1  Computed as (total liquid assets/total liquid liabilities)*ROA.   
2  Computed as (total assets/total capital)*ROA.   
3  Computed 
as (net profit before tax/total assets).   
4  Latest NPL ratio is as of August 2003.   
5  Latest loan loss provisions ratio is as of 
August 2003.   
6  Real estate loans before 1999 was included under the item “Financing, insurance and business services”.   
7  As of June 2003. 
 
In terms of covering foreign exchange risk exposures it may be observed that there has been an 
increase in hedging activities by both financial institutions and corporates. For instance, the volume of 
foreign exchange forward and swap transactions of commercial banks grew from about 21% of their 
foreign exchange transactions in 2000 to 22% in 2002 (Table 14). 
 
Table 14 
Volume of forward and swap foreign exchange transactions 
of commercial banks 
As a percentage of total foreign exchange transactions 
 Forward  Swap  Total 
2000 5.1 16.0 21.1 
2001 4.7 16.9 21.6 
2002 5.0 17.1 22.0 
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The asset quality of the banking system, however, remains a key issue that needs attention. Overall, 
the NPL ratio of banks has gone down from the peaks of late 2001 and early 2002 (Table 13). 
However, a significant decline in the magnitude of NPLs is needed to bring the ratio to more tolerable 
levels. The creation of private asset management companies, induced by the passage of the SPVA, 
can contribute to this effort. It may also be noted that while NPLs have improved, banks have been 
increasing their loan loss reserves, which has resulted in a higher loan loss reserves to loans ratio. 
Moreover, commercial bank lending to the real estate sector as a proportion of total loans has also 
declined, reducing the banking system’s exposure to this business cycle-sensitive sector. Overall, the 
regulatory framework and the banking sector have undergone some adjustments to be better able to 
adapt to changes in capital flows. 
Concluding remarks 
The Philippines experienced surges in capital flows in the 1990s. These flows influenced the level of 
domestic liquidity, the volatility of financial markets, the trend in the real exchange rate and the growth 
of asset prices. In response, adjustments in the conduct of monetary policy were made by the BSP. 
The adjustments included partial sterilisation in times of heavy capital inflows and a balancing of 
interest rate increases and peso depreciation during periods of capital flow reversals. With the recent 
adoption of an inflation targeting framework, the BSP continues to monitor and assess the impact of 
capital flows on domestic prices through the exchange rate, interest rate and liquidity channels. The 
BSP has also embarked on a wide-ranging banking sector reform process. The reform process 
involves among others the strengthening of the regulatory framework, promotion of good corporate 
governance practices and improvements to the infrastructure. It is hoped that these initiatives will 
contribute in enhancing the economy’s capacity to take advantage of the opportunities provided by a 
more integrated financial environment and in building resilience against the adverse effects of surges 
in capital flows. 
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